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Abstract:  
 
  This paper applies the lessons learned from the regulation of the tobacco industry 
to counter the obesity epidemic.  The similarities between the tobacco industry and food 
industry are more than meets the eye.  Both industries are dominated by a few major 
companies. Big Food and Big Tobacco both rely on marketing to lure children into 
buying their products, creating life-long customers.  And, both industries focus on 
creating habits and addictions to keep children and adults to keep coming back for more.  
For decades, beginning in the mid-twentieth century, Big Tobacco has been the bulls-eye 
target for federal and state regulators as well as plaintiffs’ lawyers.  And for decades, the 
tobacco industry managed to dodge the onslaught.  Big Tobacco poured massive 
lobbying dollars into Congressional coffers, denied the science underlying the deadly and 
addictive effects of nicotine, and acted “socially responsible.” It then put a mask on, 
acquiring the major food companies and sometimes changing its brand name to burnish 
its public image in the American eye.  By acquiring the food companies, Big Tobacco 
found the right partner in luring kids early through advertising.  Now, the very food 
companies that Big Tobacco saw as relatively socially responsible are coming under 
attack for promoting the obesity crisis.  And some of these food companies are using 
tactics from Big Tobacco’s playbook to evade the regulators and deny claims in court.  
Our nation waited for too long before it made inroads into regulating the nicotine that 
contributed to an epidemic of lung cancer, emphysema, and atherosclerosis.  We cannot 
afford to wait again.  We have to take active measures in adopting both a collaborative 
and regulatory approach to the food industry before the obesity epidemic becomes a crisis 
crippling our health care system, our workforce, and our children.  This paper offers 
some proposals for regulating the food industry by exploring lessons from tobacco 
regulation.  
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“America’s eating habits and lack of physical activity are literally killing us, and they’re 
killing us at record levels…Food companies are becoming increasingly responsive, and 
Kraft, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, and McDonald’s are committed to taking positive steps.” -- 
Tommy Thompson, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services at June, 2004 Time 
Magazine/ABC News “Summit on Obesity”  
 
“Why, if Coca-Cola is such a responsible corporate citizen, did it send a team of five 
lobbyists to kill his school nutrition bill?”  Charlie Brown, Chairman of Indiana’s Public 
Health Committee, Response to Tommy Thompson at Time Magazine/ABC News 
“Summit on Obesity”  
 
 
 
 
 
   3 
Introduction:   
  “Gray began buying businesses outside the tobacco industry, mostly in the food 
business, which Reynolds executives saw as an easy mark for their marketing acumen.  
Anyone who could sell a product linked with cancer, Reynolds executives were fond of 
saying, ‘call sell anything.’”
1  
 
It should have came as no surprise that RJ Reynolds Tobacco, one of the nation’s 
foremost tobacco companies, would buy one of the nation’s largest junk food companies, 
Nabisco.  Marketing and advertising prowess drove each company’s success.  In 2006, 
the six largest tobacco companies spent approximately $13 billion.
2  The food industry 
targeted children alone with $1.6 billion in advertisements for soda, fast food, and 
cereal.
3  The food industry spent approximately $36 billion on food advertisements in 
total, compared with less than $10 million in advertisements for healthy eating.
4  These 
advertisements have had detrimental impacts on health consumption choices, particularly 
those of children.  In the case, Lorillard v. Reilly (June, 2001), the court quoted the 
Surgeon General’s and Institute of Medicine’s Report: “There is sufficient evidence to 
conclude that advertising and labeling play a significant and important contributory role 
in a young person’s decision to use cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products.”
5 
  Like the tobacco companies, the food companies view children as their primary 
customers.  By hooking children early, these companies have life-long customers.  The 
                                                 
1 Bryan Burrough and John Helyar, Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco. New York: Harper 
Business.   
2 See FTC Annual Report on Cigarette Sales and Advertising, 2006.  
3 See FTC Report on Food Marketing: Perspectives on Marketing, Self-Regulation, and Childhood Obesity 
(April, 2006).     
4 See National Consumers Union (2005), available at 
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_health_care/002657.html.   
5 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General of Massachusetts (2001).  See, e.g., 60 
Fed.Reg. 41332. See also Pierce et al., Tobacco Industry Promotion of Cigarettes and Adolescent Smoking, 
279 JAMA 511, 514 (1998).  The study also found that children chose fewer brands than adults, and that 
those brands they chose were heavily advertised to them.     4 
lifetime expected revenue source from a child far exceeds that of an adult.  Moreover, 
habits develop early in life.
6  The tobacco and food companies channel much of their 
advertisements towards children, whether with Joe Camel or Ronald McDonald.    
  Several corporations in the food industry have applied lessons from Big Tobacco 
to maximize their profits.
7  To maximize profits, companies must boost revenues and 
reduce costs.  In order to increase revenues, food companies, like their tobacco 
counterparts, must distinguish themselves from each other.  Product differentiation is the 
key to success in the food industry.
8  The food industry features easy entry and few 
technological advantages.  In short, it is a commodity industry for which branding and 
marketing are the keys to success.  Therefore, to differentiate themselves, food 
companies invest billions of dollars in marketing.
9  They then lock in customers at an 
early age through targeted advertising, which can range from commercials on Saturday 
morning cartoons to exclusive contracts with schools to provide lunches and fill vending 
machines.
10   
The other way to increase profits is cost reduction.  Food companies decrease 
costs by purchasing fat-inducing ingredients, such as high fructose corn syrup and 
hormone-pumped cows, which tend to be cheaper instead of healthier, more expensive 
supplies.  Most cereal manufacturers, even the allegedly healthy ones, use high fructose 
                                                 
6 See American Heart Association, available at 
http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier=3069512 
7 See Michele Simon, Appetite for Profit, Nation Books. (2006).     
8 See Product Differentiation, Economics Web Institute, available at 
http://www.economicswebinstitute.org/glossary/product.htm.   
9 See Expense allocations for the major food companies.  McDonalds, Pepsi, Kraft.   
10 See Anna White, Multinational Monitor, available at 
http://www.essentialaction.org/spotlight/CokeSchool.html.      5 
corn syrup instead of sugar.
11  The reason is that the corn industry is heavily subsidized 
by the federal government and can provide billions of bushels of corn at rates much 
cheaper than sugar.
12  However, high fructose corn syrup is known to cause significant 
health ailments and is known to have various addictive properties.
13  High fructose corn 
syrup is the nicotine of the food industry.  Just as the big tobacco companies used 
nicotine and advertisements to create addictions and “get one’s fix,” the food companies 
are using their ingredients and commercials to create lifelong habits.   
Regulating such practices by the food industry has benefits and costs.  The danger 
with more stringent regulation by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the creation of higher barriers to entry to small 
upstarts that can produce healthier items.  However, the dangers of ineffective FDA 
regulation of the food industry is a proliferation of food products that contribute to 
obesity.  The data reveal that industry is gravitating towards healthier items due to fears 
of more FDA and state regulation.
14  The fear of regulation and litigation may be more 
effective than actual regulation or litigation in inducing companies to produce healthier 
food.   
  Congress and the regulators took the wrong approach in regulating Big Tobacco.  
The regulators had no teeth, yet continued to point the accusatory finger.  They did not 
attempt to create an effective partnership that emphasized regulation when appropriate 
                                                 
11 See Bocarsly ME, Powell ES, Avena NM, Hoebel BG, “High-fructose corn syrup causes characteristics 
of obesity in rats: increased body weight, body fat and triglyceride levels,” Pharmacol Biochem Behav. 
(Nov. 2010).   
12 See Michael Pollan, The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals (2006).  
13 See supra note 11, Boacrsly, et al. 
14 See Hank Cardello, Stuffed: An Insider’s Look at Who’s Really Making America Fat. (2010). See also 
Brie Cadman, “Will the Food Industry’s Labeling Initiative Really Combat Obesity?”, Change.Org., 
available at 
http://health.change.org/blog/view/will_the_food_industrys_labeling_initiative_really_combat_obesity,  
(Oct. 29, 2010).     6 
and collaboration where necessary.  Only now has Congress provided FDA with 
authority to regulate tobacco, which promises to yield more a more effective partnership 
in addressing the adverse impacts of Big Tobacco on public health.
15  In the case of Big 
Tobacco, Congress and the regulatory agencies failed to intervene until it was too late for 
the American public.  Congress and the regulators must not fail again.  The stakes are 
high in effectively crafting obesity regulations, and the potential benefits to public health 
are extraordinary.  The United States cannot leave this crisis to consumers to fend for 
themselves  The FDA must step up to the plate in curbing advertising and labeling 
practices that contribute to the obesity crisis, while providing incentives to corporations 
to produce and promote healthier foods.  The FDA must also educate consumers on the 
importance of eating healthy and exercising.  In addition, Congress must give the FDA 
stronger authority and enforcement powers as it did recently in the tobacco case.  
Although the FDA, along with the FTC, plays an important role to play in curbing 
the obesity epidemic, it cannot act alone.  The agency must work with consumer groups, 
the food industry itself, and the states.  A multi-pronged assault on obesity, not unilateral 
or ad hominem attacks on corporations, is critical.  Compromise with industry presents 
dangers of watered-down regulation or litigation, but vicious legislative attacks on 
particular corporations or industries will result in retaliation in the form of mammoth 
lobbying dollars to prevent passage of these bills.
16  If the FDA acts alone with its small 
                                                 
15 See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, available at http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR01256:|/bss/111search.html (2009-2010, 111th Congress).  
16 See the American Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, HR 554, available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h109-554.   The bill is also known as the Cheeseburger 
Bill.  The bill prevents civil actions that allege that organizations are a proximate cause of their obesity, 
unless an individual justifiably relied on the marketing, advertising, or labeling of a product by an 
organization that had the intent to violate a federal or state statute against such promotions, and such a 
reliance was the proximate cause of that individual’s obesity or weight gain.  The bill also does not apply to 
actions by the Federal Trade Commission under the FTC act, or the Food and Drug Administration under   7 
budget compared to corporations’ advertising coffers, it risks regulatory capture and 
losses in the courts.  If it holds hands with the very companies it is trying to regulate, it 
risks losing its regulatory teeth.  Recognizing these challenges between the food industry 
and the FDA, as well as preventing the recurrence of the endless game of cat and mouse 
played during the tobacco crisis, is a critical first step in mitigating the obesity epidemic. 
The second step will be for the FDA to begin regulating food companies in a 
collaborative way, enlisting partners from a wide network of organizations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.  Congressman Ric Keller (R-FL), the bill’s sponsor, received $300,000 
in lobbying expenditures from the fast food industry.  The Senate never voted on the bill.      8 
 
I.  Preface: Surgeon General’s Warning    
In December 2001, the US Surgeon General issued a “call to action” on obesity.  
The report cited that close to two-thirds of Americans are overweight or obese.
17   
 
Figure 1: Maps of Obesity Rates in the United States 
Percent of Obese (BMI > 30) in U.S. Adults  
 
 
Percent of Obese (BMI > 30) in U.S. Adults 
 
 
                                                 
17 See Surgeon General’s Report.  US Dept. of Health and Human Services, “The Surgeon General’s Call 
toAction to Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity,” 2001.  
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/calltoaction/CalltoAction.pdf.    9 
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Figure 1 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention suggests that 
obesity has become an epidemic, with no states having obesity rates greater than 15% in 
1988 to forty-eight states with obesity rates above 20% in 2009.
18  The trend is especially 
disturbing in the Southern United States.  Obesity is one of the major public health 
problems in the United States, if not the most significant.  Excessive weight for a given 
height can lead to heart diseases, diabetes, several forms of cancer, and other chronic 
health problems.
19  Childhood obesity increases the risk for insulin resistance, glucose 
intolerance and development of type 2 diabetes.
20  According to the Surgeon General’s 
report, approximately 300,000 people in the United State die each year due to obesity-
related conditions.  Between 1990 and 2000, the percentage of children who are 
overweight or obese doubled and the percentage of adolescents who are overweight or 
obese tripled.    
Although Surgeon General David Satcher outlined in this report the importance of 
community responsibility in resolving the obesity epidemic,
21 he is actually addressing 
personal responsibility: “Many people believe that dealing with overweight and obesity is 
a personal responsibility.  To some degree they are right, but it is also a community 
responsibility.”  By community responsibility, he includes such things as requiring daily 
physical education in the schools, providing healthy lunches at school, educating women 
                                                 
18 See Centers for Disease Control for the definition of obesity:  Body Mass Index (BMI) of 30 or higher. 
Body Mass Index (BMI) is a measure of an adult’s weight in relation to his or her height, specifically the 
adult’s weight in kilograms divided by the square of his or her height in meters.   
19 See Surgeon General’s Call to Action, supra note 18.   
20 See Abdullah, et al., “The magnitude of association between overweight and obesity and the risk of 
diabetes: A meta-analysis of prospective cohort studies: 21 May 2010 (309-319).  Journal of Diabetes 
Research and Clinical Practice, Volume 89, Issue 3.   
21 According to Satcher, community responsibility includes providing healthy lunches in schools.  See 
Surgeon General’s Call to Action, supra note 18.    10 
about the benefits of breastfeeding, and providing parks in which to jog or bike.  In only a 
few places in his report does he mention the responsibility of corporations with 
advertisements, except for a few statements about “encouraging the food industry to 
provide reasonable portion sizes,” “examining the marketing practices of the food 
industry and the construction of new food outlets,” “ensuring the meals provided through 
the school lunch programs meet nutrition standards, “evaluating the financial and health 
impact of school contracts with vendors of high-calorie foods and beverages of low 
nutritional value,” and “enforcing existing Department of Agriculture regulations 
prohibiting foods of minimal nutritional value during mealtimes in schools areas and 
vending machines.”
22  During his limited discussion of community responsibility, he is 
actually discussing personal responsibility under the guise of the name “community 
responsibility.”  While he emphasizes the importance of “examining marketing practices” 
by “evaluating the financial and health impacts of school contracts,” he does not stress 
the need to actually prevent deleterious marketing practices and hold contracts harming 
the health of children as “unenforceable” and “unconscionable.”
23   
In only a few places in his report does he mention the responsibility of industry.  
And even in those places, he wants to encourage the food industry to “provide reasonable 
food and portion sizes” and “create and sustain” a healthy environment.  He pays short 
shrift to the importance of regulating the food industry in order to provide them with 
specific deterrents and incentives to produce and market healthier foods.  In addition, 
although the Surgeon General’s Report can provide helpful policy prescriptions, it has no 
claws to regulate.  
                                                 
22 Id.  
23 Id.    11 
Satcher’s primary emphasis on community responsibility is a mistake and risks 
failed prioritization.  Industry is a major player in the obesity epidemic, and therefore, 
must be at the top of the priority list.  Food marketers spend more than $36 billion a year, 
much of which helps cultivate poor eating habits in children.
24  Children, in particular, 
have become a focus of the debate.  Companies, such as McDonald’s and Coca-Cola, are 
targeting this vulnerable population.  The result, according to the most recent Surgeon 
General’s Report, is that one in three children is overweight or obese.
25  This is especially 
troubling because obese children are likely to become obese adults.   
The recent Surgeon General’s Report’s efforts at stemming the obesity epidemic 
are more encouraging.  Surgeon General Benjamin encourages greater consumer 
knowledge so that consumers demand healthier products and industry marketing tactics 
adjust accordingly.  But why should it be up to the consumer to influence marketing 
trends, and not the government to influence corporations to change their marketing 
trends?  Surgeon General Benjamin merely wants to “strengthen and expand the 
blueprint” laid out by her predecessor.   
On the other hand, she does emphasize food advertising’s detrimental impacts on 
children: “The more time kids spend watching television, the more likely they are to 
consume the high calorie foods advertised.”
26   She also cites the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention to “limit the advertisements” of less healthy foods and beverages 
to control the obesity epidemic.  She makes some positive strides by emphasizing the 
                                                 
24 See Marion Nestle, quoted in J.M. Hirsch, “Food Industry a Target in Obesity Fight,” March 19, 2006.  
www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2006/03/18/ap2605096.html.  
 
25 See Surgeon General’s Report, 2010.  
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/obesityvision/obesityvision2010.pdf.  The prevalence of obesity 
changed little in the 1960s and 1970s, but increased dramatically in the 90’s.  The rate for adults rose from 
13.4% in 1980 to 34.3% in 2008.  For children, the rate increased from 5% in 1980 to 17% in 2008.   
26 See Surgeon General’s Report, 2010.    12 
need to “limit advertisements” rather than to simply “examine marketing practices.”  
However, like the Surgeon General’s Report that preceded hers, this report lacks teeth or 
regulatory enforcement powers.   
   
II.  Advertising and Obesity: Lessons from Big Tobacco  
Many food companies claim to be socially responsible, and their public relations 
efforts have thwarted government regulation and lawsuits.  The food industry lobbies 
government to spread the gospel that eating is an individual choice for which the industry 
is not to blame.  However, one of the strongest determinants of individual choice is 
advertising, especially when those advertisements are directed at children who lack the 
critical thinking faculties to distinguish healthy foods from unhealthy foods.  It is difficult 
to teach good nutrition when chips, soda, and candy are sold in schools and marketed on 
television with friendly cartoon characters during children’s programming.  Many 
companies in the food industry have resorted to the same tactics as Big Tobacco:  
marketing to the children who constitute its most significant consumer base, forming 
scientific “front groups” that hide their funding sources, buying off health experts, and 
political lobbying.
27  Therefore, the regulatory and litigation apparatus to defend against 
these industry attacks can also draw from the regulatory and litigation defensive 
maneuvers used in the tobacco wars.   
The main lessons from Big Tobacco with respect to advertisements are threefold.  
First, focus on one industry at a time, such as fast foods, snack foods, or beverages.  The 
successes against the tobacco industry depended partly on the fact that tobacco was one 
                                                 
27 See Kelly Brownell and Kenneth Warner, The Perils of Ignoring History: Big Tobacco Played Dirty and 
Millions Died.  How Similar is Big Food?  The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 87, No. 1 (2009) (259-294).    13 
industry with one major product.  It was easier to attack one product as responsible for 
health ills rather than to argue how several different products can contribute to lung 
cancer and other ailments.     
Second, focus on attacking the malicious marketing and advertising techniques of 
the food companies towards children rather than on whether particular foods are a 
proximate cause of obesity.  In the beginning, tobacco litigation and regulation succeeded 
by focusing on advertisements towards children, not on the addictive properties of 
nicotine.  The success of scientifically proving the addictive and deleterious properties of 
nicotine occurred several decades later, after costly and protracted fights with industry, 
featuring resistance and denial.  The regulations on advertising cigarettes to children on 
television and radio, on the other hand, were associated with a significant drop in 
smoking rates.
28   
Third, and perhaps most importantly, be wary of lobbying from the food industry 
that exacerbates the abuse of the legislative and regulatory system.  The potential capture 
of the nation’s federal regulatory apparatus would enable the food industry to consolidate 
around a few major players with significant market power.  These few major players 
form an oligopolistic cartel that could actually worsen the obesity epidemic.  In major 
tobacco litigation, for instance, major tobacco companies relied on federal legislation for 
labeling potential health hazards to argue that federal legislation preempted more 
stringent state laws.
29  Big Tobacco usually won these cases.  These lax federal laws on 
                                                 
28 In 1969, the FCC banned cigarette advertisements from television and radio.  (The number of children 
who smoked after this regulation fell).  A recent study showed that youth who watched 5 or more hours of 
TV per day were 5.99 times
 more likely to initiate smoking behaviors (95% confidence interval:
 1.39–
25.71) than those youth who watched <2 hours.  See Gidwani et al., Television Viewing and Initiation of 
Smoking Among Children.  PEDIATRICS Vol. 110 No. 3 September 2002, pp. 505-508 
29 See Lorillard v. Reilly (2001) supra note 5.   See also Thomas Cipollone v. Liggett Group (2001).      14 
labeling resulted from decades of lobbying by the tobacco industry against heavy 
regulation and in favor of preemption of strict state laws.   
In the case of food, many states, such as New York and Massachusetts, have 
passed laws clamping down on the food industry by requiring labeling and limits on  
advertising.
30  Recently San Francisco passed an ordinance banning toys in unhealthy 
foods.
31  It would be a shame to see a combination of Congressional legislation and FDA 
or FTC regulation reduce the effectiveness of these state laws restricting advertisements 
to children. 
The Big Food companies argue that they should not be blamed for the obesity 
epidemic because they are simply responding to consumer demand with both their 
advertisements and their sales.  It is unclear, however, whether they are simply 
responding to consumer demand, or actually creating it.
32  Wharton marketing professor 
Barbara Kahn writes, "marketers typically go after customer value, which includes 
offering products that customers are willing to pay for.  Marketers are not making people 
eat unhealthy foods. They are just delivering what the customer wants…But if the 
company is creating a demand, and if these people wouldn't otherwise be eating that food, 
then you are getting into a gray area."
33  Margot Wootan, director of nutrition policy at 
                                                 
30 See New York – Regulation of Smoking in Work and Public Places, §1399, available at 
http://www.nyhealth.gov/regulations/public_health_law/section/1399/.  See also Massachusetts, Law about 
Smoking, available at http://www.lawlib.state.ma.us/subject/about/smoking.html.  Food example? 
31 See San Francisco Bans Happy Meals, available at http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-happy-meals-
20101103,0,5438230.story. The Mayor of San Francisco, Gavin Newsome, is likely to veto the bill.     
32 See Margo Wootan, Food Fight: Obesity Raises Difficult Marketing Questions, available at 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1149 (2005).  
33 Id.    15 
the Center for Science in the Public Interest, says there is no question that companies try 
to create demand for their product, often at the expense of healthier options.
34    
III.  Corporate Social Responsibility and Obesity: Lessons from Big Tobacco  
  Besides lobbying the government and preempting state regulation, food 
companies are also evading regulatory scrutiny by proclaiming the mantra of “corporate 
social responsibility.” The idea behind corporate social responsibility in the obesity 
epidemic is whether food companies are doing their fair share to promote better nutrition 
and exercise.  Their version of social responsibility is personal responsibility, in other 
words shifting the onus to the consumer for the consumer’s own health.  Weight gain is a 
simple calculus: Calories in – Calories out.  The “calories in” results from higher food 
consumption.  The “calories out” results from physical activity.  The food companies are 
increasing the number of “calories in” without promoting enough the importance of 
exercise, or “calories out.”  Through sales and marketing to adults and especially children, 
McDonalds, Kraft, Coca Cola, and Pepsi are fattening our collective belly.  These 
companies’ market shares depend on the shares of the human belly that they garner.  
Their market shares do not depend on the burning of these calories.  
To be sure, the food companies have taken a few strides to promote exercise as a 
measure of social responsibility, but these efforts are far from adequate.  Moreover, these 
efforts at promoting exercise shift the blame to consumers and away from the food 
companies that are responsible for the excessive “calories in.”  For instance, several of 
the food and beverage companies have formed the Healthy Weight Commitment 
                                                 
34 Id.    16 
Foundation,
35 committed to reducing obesity over a six-year period, up to 2015.  This 
foundation consists of forty companies that are spending a mere $20 million, or $500,000 
per company, to promote exercise awareness, or personal responsibility for the obesity 
crisis.
36  The foundation is not committed to curbing the deleterious marketing practices 
or to reducing calorie or portion sizes.   
Eliminating, or containing, the obesity epidemic is about more than mere exercise.  
In a Q&A interview with Fortune, PepsiCo’s (PEP) CEO Indra Nooyi declared: “If all 
consumers exercised, did what they had to do, the problem of obesity wouldn’t exist.”
37  
Granted, exercise is a critical element in reducing the extent of the obesity epidemic, but 
it is a habit that does not develop overnight.  In addition, the food and beverage 
companies are not promoting exercise as part of their advertisements.  The one 
organization that they formed towards promoting exercise lasts until only 2015 and is 
committed to spending a paltry sum.  It is unclear how the foundation is working and 
what it has accomplished thus far in reducing obesity levels.    
The food industry appears to be using tactics from the tobacco playbook in 
feigning socially responsibility.  The tobacco industry’s playbook emphasized personal 
responsibility, lobbying to prevent government regulation, criticizing the “junk” science 
that found harms associated with smoking, introducing “safer” products, and 
manipulating and denying the addictive nature of their products and their marketing to 
                                                 
35 See Healthy Weight Commitment Foundation, available at 
http://www.healthyweightcommit.org/about/overview/ 
36 Philanthropy News Digest, “Healthy Weight Commitment Foundation Launched to Help Reduce 
Obesity,” available at http://foundationcenter.org/pnd/news/story.jhtml?id=268300002 
37 See JP Mangalindan, “If All Consumers Exercised, Obesity Wouldn’t Exit.” Fortune Magazine Interview 
with Indra Nooyi, Pepsi CEO.  April 27, 2010.    17 
children.
38  In January 4, 1954, the CEOs of the major tobacco companies published a 
‘Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers’ clarifying that “we accept an interest in people’s 
health as basic responsibility, more important than every other consideration in the 
business.”
39   
                                                 
38 See Kelly Brownell and Kenneth Warner, The Perils of Ignoring History: Big Tobacco Played Dirty and 
Millions Died: How Similar is Big Food?, The Millbank Quarterly, Vol. 87, No. 1, 2009 (259-294).  
39 See “A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers,” Tobacco Industry Research Committee, 1954, available 
at http://www.tobacco.org/Documents/dd/ddfrankstatement.html.  See also 
http://www.tobaccoinstitute.com/.     18 
 
Available at:  Tobacco Public Policy Center.  www.tobaccopolicy.org 
http://www.pmadarchive.com/getimg.asp?pgno=0&start=0&if=avadarchveidx&bool=A
%20Frank%20Statement%20to%20Cigarette%20Smokers&docid=2061004678&docnu
m=1&summary=0&sel1   19 
Despite claiming to accept social responsibility for people’s health, the tobacco 
industry, like the food industry, placed a premium on personal responsibility and 
consumer choice.  At the 1996 shareholders’ meeting of cigarette and food manufacturer 
RJR Nabisco, a woman in the audience asked company chairman Charles Harper whether 
he would want people smoking around his children and grandchildren.  Mr. Harper 
responded, “If the children don’t like to be in a smoky room… they’ll leave.”  When the 
woman responded that an infant can’t leave the room, Mr. Harper responded, “At some 
point, they learn to crawl, okay?”
40   
The food industry has also heralded personal responsibility as its mantra to evade 
blame for the obesity crisis.  It has lobbied congressmen to pass legislation that puts the 
onus on the consumer to choose healthy foods rather than industry to provide healthier 
low-calorie options.  Congressman Ric Keller (R-FL), who sponsored legislation to ban 
lawsuits against the fast-food industry for health damages stressed the need for personal 
responsibility: “We’ve got to get back to those old-fashioned principles of personal 
responsibility, of common sense, and get away from this new culture where everybody 
plays the victim and blames other people for their problems.”
41  Industry is shifting the 
blame away from themselves, the producers, and towards the consumers to whom they 
are heavily marketing.  This blame shifting begs the question of whether consumers who 
are bombarded with billions of dollars in ads can be expected to make rational decisions 
concerning their health.  Corporations employ marketing strategies and tactics based on 
                                                 
40 See RJR Nabisco, 1996. Annual Meeting of Shareholders (proceedings).  Winston Salem, NC, Apr. 17
th, 
61-62.   
41 “House Bans Fast-Food Lawsuits,” CNN, March 10, 2004. available at http://articles.cnn.com/2004-03-
10/justice/fat.lawsuits_1_frivolous-lawsuits-fast-food-industry-personal-responsibility?_s=PM:LAW.  
“"Trial lawyers have targeted the fast-food industry as the next big tobacco by bringing these insane 
lawsuits."   20 
psychological research to lure consumers into purchasing their products, leaving them 
with little ability to exercise choice.   
We can expect these corporations to seek the highest market shares and profits 
possible, not the highest shares of benefits to human health possible.  By law, a CEO’s 
fiduciary duty is to maximize profits to shareholders.
42  In Appetite for Profit, Michele 
Simon writes, “…under our current economic system it’s not a corporation’s job to 
protect public health…in fact, managers who willfully allow the bottom line to suffer to 
protect the public good can be sued by company shareholders for breach of their legal 
obligations.”
43  Simon concludes that because fiduciary duties of managers are to 
maximize shareholder value, “we really cannot expect food companies to be the 
guardians of public health.”  If we cannot expect them to be “guardians,” the government 
can encourage or require them to do so with incentives, regulation, or the threat of 
regulation.
44   
IV.  Legislation and Litigation Affecting the Tobacco Industry and Food Industry 
                                                 
42 See R. Cammon Turner, “Shareholders vs. the World,” ABA Section of Business Law.  (1999) 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/8-3shareholders.htmlCorporations, “Fiduciary Duties.”  See also Milton 
Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom. (1962): “There is one and only one social responsibility of business- to 
use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profit so long as it stays will the rules of 
the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud.” 
43 See Simon, Appetite for Profit, supra note  7.  
44 Moreover, even without the threat of regulation, these corporations may find profits in selling healthier 
products than unhealthier ones.  In fact, as consumers become more health conscious, they are switching to 
healthier options, and these companies could respond accordingly.  It is unclear, however, the extent to 
which these companies are responding to more health-conscious consumers in a re-design of their product 
line.  For healthier products initiatives, see for example Pepsi’s website on “Human Sustainability,” 
available at.  http://www.pepsico.com/Purpose/Human-Sustainability.html. See also McDonald’s website 
on eating healthy, available at http://www.fitnessandfreebies.com/food/articles/mcdonalds.html.  Whether 
or not these healthy initiatives by Pepsi and Coke are mere lip service, or will form a core of their 
respective business models, remains to be seen.    21 
The timeline below reveals the extensive federal legislation that the tobacco 
industry has faced over the past four decades.  The legislation has fallen into a few 
categories: bans on marketing, advertising, and labeling practices, limitations on smoking 
in public places, and excise taxes.  Despite scientific evidence confirming the dangers 
and addictiveness of smoking, only last year did the federal government pass legislation 
granting the FDA authority to directly regulate tobacco products.   
 
 
 
Table 1: Timeline of Federal Legislation and Litigation Against the Tobacco 
Industry  
Date  Federal Legislation/Guidelines/Litigation 
1964  Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General issued its monumental unanimous report stating that 
"cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant appropriate 
remedial action."  The committee stated unequivocally that "cigarette smoking is causally related to lung 
cancer in men; the magnitude of the effect of cigarette smoking far outweighs other factors.
45 
1965  In response to the Surgeon General’s warning, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act requiring the following Surgeon General's 
Warning on the side of cigarette packs: “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your 
Health.”
46  
1970  Congress enacted the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.
47  Introduced in 1969, the 
legislation amended the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act to strengthen warning 
labels and prohibit cigarette advertising on public airwaves. The 1969 act also included a provision 
stating that “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State 
law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in 
conformity with the provisions of this Act.”  This provision severely limited state and local efforts to 
limit tobacco promotion and advertising by preempting it with federal legislation. 
                                                 
45 See Surgeon General’s Report of 1964.  See Smoking and Health: Report of the Advisory Committee of 
the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service (1964).    
46 See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C, Chapter 36, available at 
http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/15C36.txt  
47 See Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.     22 
Date  Federal Legislation/Guidelines/Litigation 
1973  The first federal restriction on smoking in public places was enacted as the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB) required all airlines to create nonsmoking sections.   
1981  Congress increased the federal excise tax on cigarettes to sixteen cents per pack, the first increase since 
1951. 
1984  The FDA approved nicotine gum smoking cessation aid 
1986  The Surgeon General's Report, The Health Consequences of Involuntary Smoking, A Report of the 
Surgeon General, focuses on the dangers of secondhand smoke. Concludes that “[i]nvoluntary smoking 
is a cause of disease, including lung cancer, in healthy nonsmokers.”   
1987  Congress banned smoking on domestic flights of less than two hours.   
1992  The “Synar Amendment” passed by Congress required states to adopt and enforce restrictions on 
tobacco sales to minors.   
1993  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) declares secondhand smoke to be a Class A carcinogen, 
meaning that there is no safe level of exposure. The tobacco industry files lawsuit challenging findings, 
but a federal appeals court ultimately rejects challenge. 
1994  Congress passed the Pro-Children Act of 1994, prohibiting smoking in public schools and other facilities 
where federally funded children's services are provided.  
1995  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) declares nicotine to be a drug and cigarettes to be “drug 
delivery devices” subject to FDA regulation. The FDA proposes regulations governing tobacco 
promotion, labeling, and distribution. Tobacco companies challenge FDA authority in court. After multi-
year court battle, the U.S. Supreme Court rules in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. that the 
FDA lacks authority to regulate cigarettes. 
1995  The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) publishes internal documents from Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Company showing that the industry had long known about the addictiveness of 
nicotine and the harm caused by tobacco use.   
1997  The Attorneys General and tobacco industry announce proposed a settlement agreement that would 
require industry to pay $360 billion over 25 years, use bold health warning on packs, change advertising 
practices, and face fines if youth smoking did not drop to specified levels.  The proposed agreement 
would also provide the industry with immunity from class action lawsuits.  The agreement died when 
Congress refused to approve the deal. 
1997  President Clinton signed an executive order mandating smoke-free government workplaces. 
1997  The tobacco industry settled a class action lawsuit brought by flight attendants exposed to secondhand 
smoke in Broin v. Philip Morris. The Tobacco companies agreed to pay $300 million to fund research on 
tobacco-related disease.   
1998  Attorneys General of 46 states and 5 territories sign Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with tobacco 
companies to settle cost-recovery lawsuits. Cigarette manufacturers agree to pay the states more than 
$206 billion over 25 years and to abide by certain advertising and marketing restrictions. 
1999  The U.S. Department of Justice sues tobacco industry alleging a decades-long racketeering conspiracy to 
deceive the public about the harms of smoking and secondhand smoke. US v. Philip Morris. Lawsuit 
also sought recovery for treatment of tobacco-related diseases, but that portion of the lawsuit was later 
dismissed. 
2006  In the U.S. Department of Justice’s lawsuit against the tobacco industry, Judge Gladys Kessler finds that 
tobacco companies engaged in decades-long conspiracy to mislead the public, in violation of federal 
racketeering law. 
2009  Congress passes the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (S. 982), granting the FDA 
authority to regulate tobacco products.  The law allows the Food and Drug Administration to regulate 
ingredients in tobacco products, ban the marketing of "light" cigarettes, and implement the rules limiting 
the marketing of tobacco products to youth that the FDA issued in 1996.  It also repeals preemption of   23 
Date  Federal Legislation/Guidelines/Litigation 
state and local regulation of tobacco marketing and advertising, and grants states and localities broad 
rights to regulate or prohibit the sale, distribution, possession, exposure to, access to, or use of tobacco 
products.  
Sources: Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/campaign/federal/, the 
Tobacco Institute, http://www.tobaccoinstitute.com/, and the Food and Drug Administration Tobacco 
Products Site, available at http://www.fda.gov/tobaccoproducts/default.htm 
 
Along with these federal efforts to legislate, regulate, and litigate the tobacco 
industry, many states have passed laws to protect against the harms of smoking.  The 
legislatures of California and New York City have been particularly active, while 
attorneys generals in some of the other states have made strides through litigation.  
California passed a referendum to raise the cigarette tax by 25 cents in 1988 and 
dedicated 20 percent of the revenues towards tobacco control.  In 1998, California 
became the first state to enact a smoke-free law that prohibits smoking in all public 
places including bars.  New York City passed a comprehensive smoke-free law in 2002.  
On the litigation front, in 1994, Mississippi became the first state to sue the tobacco 
industry to recover costs of treating tobacco-related diseases.  In 1997 Florida and 
Mississippi settled cost-recovery lawsuits against the tobacco industry for total of total of 
$14.9 Billion.
48  These efforts at the state level were sporadic and took several decades to 
achieve.  The tobacco industry used state legislation and litigation to bolster its arguments 
that federal regulation was unnecessary, stalling efforts at federal intervention.  In the 
food industry context, regulators must be wary of this tactic.  
At the international level, in 2003, the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control was approved by 192 nations attending the World Health Organization’s World 
Health Assembly. The Framework Convention is the first international treaty that 
                                                 
48 See Tobacco Public Policy Center, available at 
http://www.law.capital.edu/Tobacco/documents/timeline.pdf.    24 
addresses tobacco control efforts.
49  These international treaties to control tobacco are 
laudable efforts, but do little to stem the influx of tobacco companies into the less 
regulated developing countries from the more regulated developed world.   
The food industry has undergone a similar history of regulation, legislation, and 
litigation for its possible role in causing the obesity epidemic.  Most of these efforts are 
more recent than tobacco regulation.  The regulatory efforts of the past two decades in the 
food industry bear some resemblance to those in the tobacco industry from the 1950s to 
the 1970s.  Below is a timeline of the recent legislation, litigation, and regulation to 
counter Big Food’s role in potentially causing obesity.  The timeline reveals that most 
efforts at combating obesity have focused on improved nutrition labeling and marketing 
standards.  Excise taxes on soda and fast foods have not gained much traction, nor have 
efforts to sue fast food companies for manufacturing and selling products that contribute 
to obesity.  Unlike in the tobacco case, the FDA has not yet been given authority to 
directly regulate contents or ingredients that expand America’s waistline.        
Table 2: Federal Legislation and Litigation Against the Food Industry  to Prevent Obesity  
Date  Federal Legislation/Guidelines/Litigation 
1914  Federal Trade Commission Act passed.  Section 5 of the Act provides that “unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in or affecting commerce,” are unlawful.
50 
1938  Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 1938 add sections 14 and 15, which expressly prohibit any food advertisement, 
other than labeling, which is “misleading in a material respect.”
51  The courts have upheld this position.
52 
1969  White House Conference on Food, Nutrition, and Health held, recommending that the FDA place greater 
emphasis on regulating the nutritional quality of food and label information about the nutritional characteristics 
of food.   
1973  FDA promulgated its first nutrition labeling requirements (37 Fed. Reg. 6493, March 30, 1972).   
1977  As part of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, Congress established a national food and human nutrition 
research program in USDA.  Congress found that “there is increasing evidence of a relationship between diet 
                                                 
49 Id.  
50 15 U.S.C. 45 (2000), 38 Stat. 717 (1914).  
51 52 Stat. 111 (1938).  
52 See Fresh Grown Preserve Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1942).   25 
Date  Federal Legislation/Guidelines/Litigation 
and some of the leading causes of death in the United States; that improved nutrition is an integral component 
of preventive health care; that there is a serious need for research on the chronic effects of diet on degenerative 
diseases and related disorders.”   
1978  FTC proposes to restrict advertising to children of sugared food products. 43 Fed. Reg. 17967 (Apr. 22, 1978).  
Effort was abandoned.   
1980  Congress enacts the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 374, 15 U.S.C. 57a(h), 
prohibiting the FTC from regulating children’s advertising as an “unfair act or practice.”   
1984  FTC issues a policy statement, reprinted in 104 F.T.C 839 (1984), whereby the Commission reaffirms the 
requirement that advertisers must “have a reasonable basis for advertising claims before they are disseminated” 
and stated that “what constitutes a reasonable basis depends, as it does in an unfairness analysis, on a number of 
factors relevant to the benefits and costs of substantiating a particular claim.”
53  This “reasonable basis” 
standard for advertising claims is less stringent than FDA’s standard of scientific proof for labeling claims. 
1984   The FDA promulgated new regulations governing the sodium labeling of food.  Sodium content became a 
mandatory part of nutrition labeling.  FDA defined the terms “sodium free,” “very low sodium,” “low sodium,” 
and “reduced sodium.”  To be labeled as reduced sodium, a food had to achieve a 75 percent reduction.  
1987 
 
 
 
The FDA adopted four general principles for health claims made for foods: 1. explicit health claims must be 
based on a consensus of medical and scientific information.  Information on the labeling must be truthful and 
not misleading; 2. explicit heath claims must emphasize that good nutrition is a function of total diet; 3.explicit 
health claims should be reasonably uniform from product to product in order to make it more understandable 
and less confusing to consumers; 4. Dietary “power races” should be prevented.   
 
 
1990  National Nutrition Monitoring and Related Research Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 1034, 7 U.S.C 5301, passed, 
establishing a comprehensive federal interagency approach to nutrition monitoring. 
1990  The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (N, L&E) signed into law by President Bush.  The law dealt with six 
matters related to the FDA’s regulation of the nutrient content of food.   Section 403(q) was added to the F, 
D&C Act to require nutrition labeling for all food products.  It also authorized FDA to set standards for serving 
sizes.  Second, FDA was required to define the nutrient descriptors in use throughout the food industry: high 
fiber, low fat, reduced cholesterol.   Third, the FDA was required to review specified disease prevention claims 
to determine whether they were appropriate for labeling.  Fourth, the NL, and E Act contained several new food 
labeling and food standards provisions.  Vegetable and fruit juice beverages were required to bear the percent 
of each juice on the information panel.  All ingredients in standardized food products were required to be 
included in the label statement of ingredients.  Fifth, all of the labeling requirements under the FD&C Act were 
made subject to national uniformity (federal preemption) except for the general prohibition against false or 
misleading labeling, health and safety warnings, special dietary food regulation, and such local matters as unit 
pricing and open date labeling.  By requiring national uniformity in nutrient labeling, nutrient descriptors, 
disease prevention claims, food standards, and the other food labeling provision involved, the NL&E Act 
removed state and local government from establishing regulatory requirements relating to the nutrient content 
of food.  NLEA explicitly required nutrition labeling to include fat, calories from fat, saturated fat, and 
cholesterol.
54   
1999  FDA amends nutrition labeling regulations to require that trans fat be labeled separately as part of the nutrition 
labeling.
55  
2003  Litigation commences against the fast food industry: Pelman v. McDonalds Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 
(S.D.N.Y 2003).   
                                                 
53 See Hutt, Merrill, and Grossman.  
54 See Hutt, Merrill, and Grossman, Food and Drug Law, Foundation Press (2007).   
55 See 64 Fed. Reg. 62746 (Nov. 17, 1999).     26 
Date  Federal Legislation/Guidelines/Litigation 
2005  “Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act” considered before Congress.  Bill would prohibit new and 
dismiss pending civil actions by any person against a manufacturer, marketer, distributor, advertiser, or seller of 
food or a trade association for any injury related to a person's accumulated acts of consumption of food and 
weight gain, obesity, or any associated health condition.   
2005  FDA issues report and related advance notice of proposed rulemaking in 63 Fed. Reg. 17008.  The focus is to 
change nutrition labeling to increase the emphasis on the caloric content and the serving size for packaged food.  
FDA’s principal regulatory authority over obesity is its control over food labeling.   
2008  The FTC released the results of its study of food marketing to adolescents and children. The FTC found that 44 
major food and beverage marketers spend $1.6 billion to promote products to children (defined as children 
under 12) and adolescents (age 12 to 17). The FTC noted that the ad campaigns tend to be integrated, 
combining television commercials with packaging , in-store advertising, sweepstakes and Internet advertising.
56 
Sources: Hutt, Merrill, and Grossman (2007), FTC Food Marketing Report  
 
V.  Similarities between Big Tobacco and Big Food:  More than Meets the Eye 
“Habits formed in childhood are like instincts. Habits will become a person's 
nature.” Confucius 
 
Rogan Kersh and James Morone, two political scientists, indicate that demonizing 
an industry with labels such as “evil” are necessary to convert the personal epidemics into 
political priorities.
57  Tobacco is their primary example of an industry that the public 
demonized.  Such demonization often resulted in a defensive posture by Big Tobacco, 
replete with denials and lobbying to thwart regulation.  Although the resulting 
criminalization and prohibitions can have their downsides, collaborating with industry 
                                                 
56 See Latham and Watkins website: Advertising and Marketing Regulation: Recent US Developments, 
available at http://www.lw.com/practices.aspx?page=amrrecentusdevelopments.  The report did not 
criticize all food marketing but called on companies to "adopt and adhere to meaningful, nutrition-based 
standards for marketing their products to children under 12." The report noted that the food and beverage 
industries have made "significant progress" since 2005 in promoting more nutritious products. It 
commended 13 of the largest food and beverage companies for adopting the Children's Food and Beverage 
Advertising Initiative of the Better Business Bureau, which calls on companies not to advertise at all to 
children under 12 or to limited advertising to this group to products that meet certain nutritional standards. 
The report also recommended that media and entertainment companies restrict the licensing of their 
characters to companies that engage in marketing healthier foods and beverages to children.  See 
Congressional legislation, S. Rep. No. 109-88, at 108 (2005), directing the FTC to produce this report.  The 
FTC Food Marketing Report is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/07/P064504foodmktingreport.pdf.  
57 See Kersh and Morone, How the Personal Becomes Political: Prohibitions, public health and obesity. 
Studies in American Political Development, 2002: 16:162-175.     27 
can result in industry’s co-optation of the legislative, regulatory, and litigation 
processes.
58  The tobacco industry’s co-optation of the primary weapons in public 
health’s arsenal offers lessons of caution when collaborating with the food industry to 
contain the obesity crisis.   
The history of tobacco regulation is a long, slow, and tedious one full of attempts 
at regulation, followed by industry lobbying to prevent any intrusions on its profit-
making and pretensions of social responsibility.  Ultimately, efforts at tobacco regulation 
have been somewhat successful in reducing the number of smokers in the United States.  
These achievements occurred only after a long drawn-out process full of denials that 
nicotine is addictive and consequent deaths ranging in the millions from lung cancer and 
other illnesses resulting from smoking.  Legislators, regulators, and litigators must be 
wary of following the same tragic path for obesity regulation.   
Understanding the similarities and differences between the food industry and the 
tobacco industry is essential to discerning lessons from tobacco regulation.  The 
similarities are more than meets the eye, and the differences are exaggerated. 
The first difference claimed is that food is a “necessary” product, whereas tobacco 
can be considered an unnecessary “luxury” item.
59  Given the addictive properties of 
nicotine, “getting one’s fix” makes tobacco a “necessary” product, whereby income and 
price have little effect on the quantity demanded.  The evidence illustrates this 
proposition: the heaviest smoking rates are concentrated in the lowest income brackets of 
                                                 
58 See Brownell and Horgen, Food Fight, Contemporary Books (2004).  
59 Economists refer to a “necessary” good as one in which price elasticity of demand is inelastic, such that 
increases in price do not significantly affect quantity demanded.  A luxury good features a much more 
elastic price elasticity of demand, whereby an increase in price will result in a significant decline in 
quantity demanded.  See Case and Fair, Principles of Microeconomics, Pearson Education (2007).     28 
the US population.
60  Smoking rates are highest for those below the poverty level.  In 
addition, despite the increase in excise taxes on cigarettes during the period 1985-2002, 
the percentage of smokers at “below the poverty” level remained relatively constant.
61   
When discussing “food,” many members of industry and Congress lump all foods 
into one basket.  But food, unlike cigarettes, comes in many shapes and sizes that have 
widely varying effects on the human body.  Unhealthy, or “bad” foods, cause obesity, not 
healthy or “good” foods.  Snack foods like Oreos and Doritos, carbonated beverages like 
Pepsi and Coke, and fast foods like McDonalds hamburgers and fries, are “bad” or 
fattening foods.  The minimal impact of an increase in price of these “bad” foods on the 
quantity demanded, even at lower income levels, suggests that these bad foods have some 
of the same properties as cigarettes.
62  Addictive is perhaps not the most apt description 
for these foods. “Habit” creates the continued consumption of these foods from childhood 
well into adulthood.  Habits form early, and habits die hard.  Snack food, fast food, and 
carbonated beverage companies, such as Kraft, McDonalds, and Pepsi “get ‘em early,” 
locking in these customers for life.  Consumption of these bad foods is therefore 
“inelastic,” meaning that consumption would change little with an increase in excise 
tax.
63  Economists Fletcher, Frisvold, and Tefft found that an increase in the soft drink tax 
by 55% would decrease the percentage of obese and overweight children by only .7% 
                                                 
60 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Vital Signs: Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults 
Aged >= 18 Years in the United States,” available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5935a3.htm.  
61 The percentage of smokers at other income levels declined, indicating that factors other than price could 
be primarily responsible for the overall decline in cigarette purchases during the period.  Such factors 
include education and better warning labels.    
62 See Kitty Kay Chan and Tom Capehart, Health Concerns or Price: Which Takes Credit for Declining 
Cigarette Consumption in the US?  Choices Magazine. 1
st Quarter, 2004.  
63 See Jason Fletcher, Daniel Frisvold, and Nathan Tefft, The Effects of Soft Drink Taxes on Child and 
Adolescent Consumption and Weight Outcomes, August 2009 Working Paper Series.    29 
points.
64  This finding suggests that like cigarettes, which are regressive and inelastic to 
prices due to their addictive nature, soda pop drinking habits cannot alter overnight as a 
result of price changes.   
Figure 1 reveals the burden of excise taxes falls disproportionately on the poorest.  
An excise tax on fast foods or beverages, therefore, may have the most detrimental 
financial impacts on the lowest income groups, because their consumption of these 
products is inelastic to price and their consumption of these products exceeds that of any 
other income demographic.  An excise tax at lower levels, however, may help curb the 
poor’s consumption of these products, improving health outcomes.
65      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 Id.  
65 For support of this theory, see Kelly Brownell and Thomas Frieden, Ounces of Prevention: The Public 
Policy Case for Taxes on Sugared Beverages, N Engl J Med 2009; 360:1805-1808.     30 
Figure 1: Percent of Income Paid in Federal Excise Taxes, 2006 by Income Group 
 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Historical Effective Tax Rates: 1979 to 2006, April 2009 
  In the tobacco case, an excise tax was successful in curbing smoking rates at the 
“above poverty levels.”  Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that the gradual increase from the total 
excise tax of 32 cents in 1983 to 83 cents in 2002 corresponded to a concomitant decline 
in smoking rates at the “above poverty” level from 40% to 30%, and at the “below 
poverty” level from 30% to 25%.  However, the marginal reduction in smoking rates 
from an increase in excise tax after 1990 appeared to be minimal.  The most significant 
reduction appeared between 1983 and 1990 when the excise tax increased from 32 cents 
to 46 cents. Therefore, the increase in excise taxes from approximately 46 cents in 1990 
to nearly 83 cents in 2002 resulted in a negligible decline in smoking rates.  A similar 
concern arises in the case of obesity.  An excise tax larger than a certain amount could 
result in a negligible impact on obesity rates.  
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Figure 2:  Federal and State Per-Pack Cigarette Tax Rate (1983-2002) 
 
                      Sources: USDA Economic Research Service (2002), Orzechowski & Walker (2001). 
 
Figure 3: Smoking Rates Among Adults Aged >=18 years from 1983 to 2002 
 
Source: US Census Bureau  
A second oft-cited difference between tobacco and food is that cigarettes are an 
adult consumption item, whereas many foods are intended for both children and adults.  
Joe Camel and his counterparts shatter this myth.  Both the food industry and tobacco 
industry target children, and they attack them with ads intended to strike their   32 
subconscious.  Children are the lifelong customers whose habits and addictions form in 
childhood.
66  They are also the most vulnerable to advertising.
67  The food companies, 
like the tobacco industry, understand both of these principles and exploit them, often to 
the detriment of children’s health.   
Recently-released documents from R.J. Reynolds' tobacco company establish that 
the company intended to direct their advertising efforts toward children as young as 14: 
“As this 14-24 age group matures, they will account for a key share of the total cigarette 
volume for at least the next 25 years. Thus our strategy becomes clear for our established 
brands: direct advertising appeal to the younger smokers.”
68 Another RJ Reynolds 
executive noted in a memorandum: "Realistically, if our Company is to survive and 
prosper, over the long term, we must get our share of the youth market. In my opinion, 
this will require new brands tailored to the youth market."
69  Philip Morris also produced 
internal documents showing how their profits depended on the youth market: “[T]he 
success of Marlboro Red during its most rapid growth period was because it became the 
brand of choice among teenagers who continued to use them when they grew older.”
70  
“Thus, the ability to attract new smokers and develop them into a young adult franchise is 
                                                 
66 See Joy Blakeslee, Good Eating Habits Formed in Childhood Promote Lifelong Health, available at 
SoyConnection.Com, 
http://www.soyconnection.com/pressroom/press_release_view.php/Good+Eating+Habits+Formed+in+Ch
ildhood+Promote+Lifelong+Health?id=70:  “Eating habits formed in childhood—both good and bad—
track into adulthood. Once unhealthy habits are formed, changing behavior is much more difficult…this 
may make the difference between a healthy lifespan and one with chronic diseases.” 
67 Young children are particularly vulnerable to advertising as they are often unable to distinguish 
advertising from programs. US researchers, Dale Kunkel (University of California at Santa Barbara) and 
Don Roberts (Stanford University) say that children under age of 5 or 6 do not distinguish effectively 
between advertisements and the programs they are watching.  See Kunkel and Roberts, Young Minds and 
Marketplace Values: Issues in Children’s Television Advertising, Journal of Social Issues (Vol. 47, Issue 1, 
pgs. 57-72), Spring 1991.   
68 Quotation from C.A. Tucker, R.J. Reynolds' vice president for marketing, 1974 
69 See Claude Teague, RJR, "Research Planning Memorandum on Some Thoughts About New Brands of 
Cigarettes for the Youth Market," February 2, 1973.  
70 Special Report,“Young Smokers: Prevalence, Trends, Implications, and Related Demographic Trends,” 
PM Doc. #1000390803/55, March 31, 1981.    33 
key to brand development.”
71  Ninety percent of all young smokers choose the three most 
heavily advertised brands. Marlboro, the most heavily advertised brand, constitutes 
almost 60% of the youth market but only 25% of the adult market.
72  A 1993 survey 
revealed that Marlboro decreased in adolescent popularity by almost 9%, while Camel 
gained more than 5%, fluctuations directly coinciding with the respective companies' 
brand-specific advertising expenditures.
73  This shift in preference also coincided with the 
introduction of Old Joe Camel's cartoon image, which has become widely familiar among 
young children. Studies have found more than 90% of six-year-olds can match Joe Camel 
with pictures of a cigarette, making him as well known as Disney's mascot, Mickey 
Mouse.  By comparison, only 67% of adults recognize Joe Camel.
74  The tobacco 
companies depend on advertisements to youth for a large share of their profits.    
The food companies engage in a similar type of advertising to the youth market.  
Children constitute an estimated 72% of family food and beverage purchases.
75 Children 
ages 7 to 12 also spend $2.3 billion of their own money on snacks and beverages each 
year, while teenagers spend $13 billion at fast-food restaurants alone.  The United States 
food industry spends $36 billion a year on advertising, making it the second largest 
advertiser in the American economy.  However, 95% of the 10,000 food commercials 
children see each year are for foods high in sugar and fat, as total advertising 
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smoking. JAMA1998;279:511–15. See also G. Ferris Wayne, GN Connolly, How Cigarette Design Can 
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74 See Fischer, P. M., Schwartz, M. P., Richards, J. W., Goldstein, A. O., & Rojas, T. H. (1991). Brand logo 
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expenditures tend to be highest for convenience food, confectioneries, snacks, and soft 
drinks.
76  The two things sold to children most on TV are toys and food, and 98 percent 
of the food advertising is for products children don't have to eat, non-nutritious things.   
Big food has long penetrated our television sets, particularly during Saturday 
morning cartoons where sugary cereals and soft drinks dominate television 
advertisements.  In a report entitled Food Marketing to Children and Youth: Threat or 
Opportunity, the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies concluded that food 
marketing, especially on television, influenced the diets, preferences, and the requests of 
children under the age of 12.
77  Food and beverage advertising on television influences 
children ages to 2–11 years to prefer and purchase high-calorie and low-nutrient foods 
and beverages.
78  The Institute also found that the food and beverage industries spend $10 
billion a year marketing their products through various channels and the “preponderance 
of the products introduced and marketed for children and youth have been high in total 
calories, sugars, salt, fat, and low in nutrients.”
79  Of the more than $200 billion children 
and youth collectively spend annually, the top four leading items children ages 8–12 
years select, without parental permission, are high-calorie and low-nutrient foods and 
beverages.
80  Some members of Congress recognize the powerful impacts of food 
marketing on children’s consumption habits.  Senator Tom Harkin stated, “The food 
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industry doesn’t spend $10 billion a year on ads because they like to waste money.  The 
ads not only work, but they work brilliantly.”
81     
More recently, the major food companies have infiltrated our schools through 
vending machines and the National School Lunch Program.  Coca-Cola, for instance, 
markets its products in schools to children of all ages, through exclusive “pouring rights” 
contracts.
82  Oregon school districts get $12-$24 per student a year from drink sales.  
Even though each additional daily serving of a sugar-sweetened beverage is found to be 
associated with a 60 percentage point increased risk of obesity, the schools are turning a 
blind eye.
83  Although Coca-Cola refers to its model guidelines that recommend that soda 
not be sold in elementary school, this policy is voluntary and not enforced.
84  Despite 
these guidelines, many elementary schools throughout the nation still have vending 
machines.  A 2002 survey of Kentucky schools found that 44 percent of elementary 
schools had vending machines.
85  Schools receive benefits from these contracts, despite 
the nefarious health effects for children.  On average Kentucky schools made over $6000 
a year in revenue from vending machines.  This meager revenue pales in comparison to 
the total budget allocated to schools and the severe long-term costs on the health of 
children.   
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A few lawyers filed a lawsuit against soda makers in Massachusetts, alleging that 
sales of unhealthy beverages, such as full-calorie sodas, sports drinks, iced tea drinks and 
juice drinks without much juice, in high schools constitute unfair and deceptive 
marketing. The suit also cited the ways in which the large illuminated Coke and Pepsi 
machines lining school halls and cafeterias are an "attractive nuisance."
86  This litigation 
was eventually dropped as states and school districts throughout the country, including 
Massachusetts, banned the sale of junk food and sugary drinks in school vending 
machines and school stores.  
A third similarity between Big Food and Big Tobacco is that contrary to popular 
perception, Big Food does not consist of a diffuse array of food companies, but a few 
major companies, just as Big Tobacco.  Therefore, as in the case of Big Tobacco, it is 
easy to focus regulatory moves on a few companies responsible for selling unhealthy 
products, rather than a panoply of food makers.  It is also easy to recognize that these few 
companies have significant political clout and deep pockets that they can use to influence 
the legislatures.  Philip Morris has a fifty percent share of the United States market for 
cigarettes.
87  Its nearest competitor, RJ Reynolds, has close to a thirty percent market 
share.
88  Together, these two companies alone comprise eighty percent of the total market 
for cigarettes.  The unhealthy food industry is actually a composite of four segments: fast 
foods, snack foods, candy including chocolate and gum, and carbonated soft drinks. In 
the carbonated soft drinks market, Coca Cola has 42.8 percent of the market, Pepsi has 
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31.1 percent of the market.
89  Together, they constitute 73.9 percent of the US market.  In 
the chewing gum market, after its acquisition of Cadbury, Kraft has nearly a thirty 
percent market share of the global market,
90 with Wrigley a thirty-four percent market 
share.  In the general candy market, Hershey holds a 44.7 percent of the US retail market, 
and Mars owns a 31.6% share.
91  In snack foods, Kraft has a 26 percent market share.
92 In 
fast foods, McDonalds owns a 70 percent market share, with its nearest competitor, 
Burger King at only 20%.
93 The high degree of concentration in the food industry, as in 
the tobacco industry, makes these companies targets of regulation and litigation.  But the 
oligopolistic nature of these industries also makes the few players extremely powerful as 
lobbyists on Capitol Hill, advocates for less stringent federal regulations to preempt more 
severe state laws, easier cooperation to erect high barriers to entry with regulation, and 
more effective in persuading the courts that regulations against advertising to children 
violate the industry’s right to free speech. 
Lobbying Expenditures in the food industry, as in the tobacco industry, have 
traced important pieces of legislation before Congress that would directly impact the 
obesity problem or the smoking public health concerns.  As the food industry receives 
greater legislative and regulatory scrutiny for promoting obesity over the past few years, 
it has dramatically increased its lobbying expenditures.  The Labeling Education and 
Nutrition Act of 2009 recently went to committee in both the House and Senate.
94  If 
passed, the act would require food service franchises to display calorie counts for all of 
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would-lift-kraft-foods-stock.  
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its foods, drastically increasing costs for the fast food industry.  To prevent passage of 
this legislation, McDonald’s increased its lobbying expenditures by nearly 100% between 
2009 and 2010 from $480,000 to $1M.
95  In 2009, Pepsi spent nearly $10M on lobbying 
expenditures, nearly a 1000% increase over its normal annual expenditures, to prevent 
passage of the Food Marketing in Schools Assessment Act (HR 3625) and the Obesity 
Prevention, Treatment, and Research Act of 2009.
96  Big Tobacco had its own share of 
heavy lobbying when laws threatened its profits.  In 2001, for instance, Philip Morris’ 
lobbying expenditures increased from only $10K in 2000 to nearly $320K, a 3000% 
increase.  The Reason: Philip Morris lobbied for increased FDA regulation over smoking 
advertisements to teens to immunize itself from further litigation and government 
criticism, thereby erecting greater barriers to entry against its competitors.
97 
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Figure 4:  Lobbying Expenditures by Major Food and Tobacco Companies 
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VI. Case Study of Philip Morris Tobacco: A Lesson for Kraft Foods? 
A Philip Morris research official wrote in 1972, “The cigarette should be 
conceived not as a product but as a package.  The product is nicotine…Think of the 
cigarette pack as a storage container for a day’s supply of nicotine.”
98  Dr. Victor J. 
DeNoble, a research official at Philip Morris, conducted a study on rats in 1983 that 
suggested that nicotine was addictive in humans.
99  Philip Morris withdrew this study 
from publication in the Journal of Pharmacology.
100  This research was concluded five 
years before the United States Surgeon General declared nicotine to be addictive.
101  
Philip Morris depended on the addictive properties of nicotine in order to boost profits at 
the expense of consumer health.
102  
In order to understand the corporate strategies that the food and tobacco 
companies apply, we will go behind the curtain and into the conference rooms of two 
major companies: Kraft and Philip Morris.  Kraft is the largest American food company 
in revenue.
103  Philip Morris is the largest cigarette company in market share.
104  Philip 
                                                 
98 See W.L. Dunn, Jr. 1972. 1972  Philip Morris Internal Document, available at 
http://tobaccodocuments.org.   
99 See Victor John DeNoble, II, “Deposition of VICTOR JOHN DENOBLE, II, Ph.D., September 16, 1988, 
SHIRES v. CELOTEX CORP.,” http://tobaccodocuments.org/datta/DENOBLEV091688.html. 
100 Philip J. Hilts, “Philip Morris Blocked ‘83 Paper Showing Tobacco Is Addictive, Panel Finds,” New 
York Times, April 1, 1994 
101 See “Statement of Everett C. Coop Before Press Conference with Senator Bradley,” September 15, 1988, 
available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/QQ/B/C/W/P/_/qqbcwp.pdf.   
102 See Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 340 Or 35, 127 P3d 1165 (2006).  In this case, the Oregon Supreme 
Court awarded punitive damages to plaintiff based on the fact that Philip Morris had the desire to make 
“illicit profits” off of the plaintiff who was addicted to nicotine.  
103 In 2009, Kraft generated $40.1 billion in revenues.  See Kate Robinson, “America’s Biggest Food 
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Morris purchased Kraft in 1998.
105  This was not the first mega-merger between Big 
Food and Big Tobacco.  A similar merger between a major tobacco and food company 
occurred when RJ Reynolds acquired Nabisco only thirteen years earlier in 1985 for $4.9 
billion.
106  RJ Reynolds and Philip Morris are the two most prominent tobacco companies 
in the United States.
107  Kraft and Nabisco are the two largest snack “junk food” 
companies in the United States.
108  Companies buy other companies for a variety of 
reasons, but with the end goal of increasing profits.  Big Tobacco recognized in Big Food 
a target for which they it could employ the same marketing tactics that it had been using 
for decades to sell cigarettes.
109 
Philip Morris sells a few major products.  For the purposes of this section, we will 
focus on cigarettes.  Its major cigarette brands in the United States are Marlboro, Virginia 
Slims, Benson and Hedges, Merit, and Parliament.  Marlboro constitutes 42% of all 
Philip Morris USA cigarette sales.
110  A cursory examination of Philip Morris’ website 
makes it appear like a non-profit anti-tobacco institute or even a tobacco regulatory wing 
of the FDA.  The company makes it clear that the site does not sell, market, or advertise 
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Philip Morris products.  The second line of its mission statement reads: “Align with 
Society: We will actively participate in resolving societal concerns that are relevant to 
our business.” In its products section, Philip Morris lists briefly the packaging, 
advertising, and product regulations with which it is complying.  Philip Morris is clear to 
specify on this website that “This is the corporate website of Philip Morris USA.  It does 
not sell, advertise, or offer promotions for our products.”  The website even offers a 
“QuitAssist” program for people who decide to quit smoking.  While such efforts are 
laudable, deeper inspection into Philip Morris’ practices reveal other insidious practices 
that must be corrected.  These practices are similar to those of the major companies in the 
food industry and offer some lessons for tackling obesity.    
Then how does Philip Morris become profitable?  One look at Philip Morris’ 
annual report directed at shareholders provides detail into how Philip Morris stays 
competitive and becomes even more profitable in a world of increased regulatory scrutiny.  
For one, the Altria Corporation masks the difficulties experienced by Philip Morris USA.  
The Altria Corporation owns Philip Morris USA, but has a well-diversified product group, 
including wines, smokeless cigarettes, snack foods, and financial services.  Although 
Philip Morris USA’s operating income increased by only 2.2% between 2008 and 2009, 
the Altria Group’s profits increased by significantly more, approximately 20 percent.
111  
The name change to Altria, itself, resulted from the Philip Morris Companies’ deliberate 
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decision to avoid the negative connotations associated with the Philip Morris brand in the 
United States.
112   
Another means by which the Philip Morris companies have grown is through 
divestiture.  Philip Morris’ most significant growth areas lie in its international operations  
Philip Morris USA’s operating income for its cigarettes in 2009 was a mere $4.5 billion. 
Philip Morris International’s profit in 2009 was much higher at $10.04 billion and its net 
profit margin was 10.22%.  In 2006, prior to the spin-off, sales at Philip Morris 
International were more than double those at the U.S. unit, with 2006 revenues at $48.26 
billion compared to Philip Morris USA’s $18.47 billion.
113  To evade the damper of 
stringent regulation and litigation in the United States, Philip Morris split its domestic 
division from its international division, creating Philip Morris International and Philip 
Morris USA in 2004.  While Philip Morris USA stayed with Altria, Philip Morris 
International became its own public traded company (PM) in 2008.  However, the 
shareholders of Altria continued to be the shareholders of Philip Morris International 
after the spin-off.
114  Altria’s spin-off of Philip Morris International appears to have been 
a well-executed strategy by the Altria board to remove the potential negative liabilities 
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associated with its international tobacco business, while retaining ownership stakes in a 
highly profitable business.
115   
A review of the historical development of Philip Morris USA reveals a chain of 
legislation, regulations, litigation, and corporate voluntary practices that caused it to 
appear so wary of public health, while at the same time continuing to promote unhealthy 
products.  Philip Morris had a history of massive lobbying campaigns,
116 marketing to 
youth to capture its customers, and pretending that its products were safe or becoming 
“safer” at every turn of the regulatory corner. 
 
1.  Philip Morris’ Strategic Reactions to Litigation, Regulation, and Legislation:  
  Philip Morris is, will be, and has always been in the business of generating profits.  
They are in the business of generating profits to increase shareholder value, not 
stakeholder value.  
  Tobacco companies, such as Phillip Morris, have joined hands with the food 
industry in a lobbying group called the Center for Consumer Freedom, headed by Richard 
Berman, a tobacco lobbyist.  This group is a lobby for the restaurant, food, beverage, 
alcohol, and tobacco industries.  Philip Morris has provided it a grant of $3,000,000.
117   
   
    a. Philip Morris’  Strategic Reactions to Litigation:  
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  There have been several lawsuits against Philip Morris alleging that its cigarettes 
were a proximate cause for lung cancer.  A recent case, Boeken v. Philip Morris USA Inc. 
involved a lawsuit against Philip Morris for misleading in its advertisements for light 
cigarettes.  A Los Angeles jury had awarded the plaintiffs $3 billion in punitive damages 
and $5.5 million in back pay to Boeken.
118  This case lasted for over a decade and wound 
itself all the way to the Supreme Court after multiple appeals by Philip Morris.  The 
product here was light cigarettes that Philip Morris claimed had less nicotine per puff.  
However, the court found that most smokers compensated for the limited amount of 
nicotine per puff by taking more puffs.  Philip Morris denied such assertions in court, 
another example of how the company feigned to be taking socially responsible measures, 
but the ultimate change was minimal.   
In fact, marketing these cigarettes as light cigarettes may have exacerbated the 
problem because smokers who were otherwise trying to quit smoking would smoke the 
light cigarettes, believing that doing so would lower their risks for cancer and other 
diseases.  They may have also believed that this was an interim approach towards quitting.  
But in reality, light cigarettes did not curtail the dangers of smoking, but may have 
actually exacerbated them.  In making a few of these arguments, the Appeals Court for 
the Second District of California upheld the jury verdict, except for the punitive damages 
amount, which it reduced to $50 million because the initial ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages appeared exorbitant.
119 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.   
    Another argument brought by the plaintiffs in Boeken was the particular 
susceptibility of youth to Philip Morris’ cigarettes, especially the Marlboro brand.  The 
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plaintiff Boeken started smoking when he was ten.  Marvin Goldberg, Boeken’s 
marketing, advertising, and consumer behavior expert, described the significant impact 
that cigarettes ads had on adolescent boys and concluded that Philip Morris intended to 
target its advertisement to young male “starters” from 10 to 18 years old, beginning in 
1955.
120  The cigarette advertisements influenced Boeken’s desire to smoke at a young 
age, hooking him to the addictive effects of nicotine.  This story provides yet another 
example of the tobacco industry’s intent to capture customers by targeting them at early 
ages, when they are most impressionable and when they start developing lifelong habits.    
Since Boeken, Philip Morris split into Philip Morris USA and Philip Morris 
International.
121  Philip Morris USA and Philip Morris International were both divisions 
of the Altria Group until the recent spinoff of Philip Morris International.  Philip Morris 
International generated the vast majority of the Altria Group’s profits in cigarettes, 
whereas Philip Morris provided a much smaller percentage.  Philip Morris’ response to 
extensive litigation in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s was to break up the company.  
One division would be the US money-loser, the public relations face of the company in 
the face of increased governmental regulatory scrutiny.  The other division was the 
international gold mine that could generate heaps of income off the lungs of people 
around the world unprotected by their governments’ policies.   
 
    b.  Philip Morris’ Strategies in Response to the Regulators  
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  Since the 1950’s, the FDA and the FTC have tried to regulate Big Tobacco, 
particularly Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds.  In 1997, the FTC filed a lawsuit against RJ 
Reynolds to ban Joe Camel from most RJ Reynolds advertisements because they tended 
to affect children.
122  In 1999, the FTC dismissed its complaint because the Master 
Settlement between the State Attorneys General and RJ Reynolds resolved the Joe Camel 
issue.
123  The FTC was less successful in banning the Marlboro man from Philip Morris 
advertisements.  The FTC also banned advertisements for tobacco on television.  The 
FTC argued that these advertisements affected consumers’ consumption of products that 
were dangerous to their health.  The FTC found that Joe Camel, unlike the Marlboro man, 
had a particularly pernicious effect on children by luring children into becoming 
consumers at an early age, thereby locking them into the “cancer sticks” for life.      
  The FDA, on the other hand, was much less successful in regulating tobacco.  In 
fact, tobacco did not come under the FDA’s regulatory jurisdiction for decades until just 
recently in the 2009.
124  Therefore, the government did not have regulatory authority over 
the content or substance of what Philip Morris made.  Philip Morris could continue to 
deny the addictive effects of nicotine, meanwhile continuing to produce cigarettes with 
high nicotine doses.   
The government was able to regulate the advertising, but not the actual substance 
of the product.  This restriction on the government’s ability to regulate communication 
but not content relates to an aversion in American society for government’s involvement 
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in a business’ product unless that product is known to have adverse effects.  The burden 
of proof for the government or plaintiff to show deleterious impacts is often extremely 
high, rising to the level of “beyond a reasonable doubt” or “by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”
125   
In the case of advertising, regulation rather than litigation is a primary weapon of 
choice.  Regulation of advertising collides with free speech concerns under the First 
Amendment.  However, a regulation on advertising can overcome First Amendment 
concerns if it passes the Central Hudson test, which provides that regulations that restrict 
advertising that is deceptive or that is for an illegal product or service is constitutional.  If 
the advertising is neither deceptive nor for an illegal product or service, the test requires 
that the government show that the regulation directly advance a substantial interest and is 
narrowly tailored to advancing that interest.
126    
Philip Morris sometimes resorted to litigation against the regulators themselves in 
order to continue advertising.  The company, in addition to many other large tobacco 
industry players, would invoke the Central Hudson test in order to claim that regulations 
restricting its advertisements violated the US Constitution.  Along with Lorillard Tobacco 
Company, Brown and Williamson Tobacco, and RJ Reynolds, Philip Morris filed a 
lawsuit against the Massachusetts Attorney General on February 1, 2000.  In this case, 
Lorillard et al. v. Reilly, Philip Morris and the other major tobacco companies succeeded 
in convincing the Supreme Court that Massachusetts regulations governing the 
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corporation committed a crime “beyond a reasonable doubt.” In a civil case, “preponderance of the 
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126 See Central Hudson v. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of NY, 447 US 557 , 
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advertisements of their tobacco products violated the First Amendment of the 
Constitution and failed the Central Hudson Test.
127  The regulations issued by the 
Massachusetts Attorney General banned cigarette advertisements within 1,000 feet of 
playgrounds or schools and indoor point-of-sale advertisements lower than 5 feet high.
128  
The purpose of these regulations was to curtail the negative effects of advertisements on 
children.  The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held in favor of Philip Morris and the 
other cigarette plaintiffs that the regulations restricting outdoor and indoor point-of-sale 
advertisement violated the First Amendment of the Constitution.  Applying the Central 
Hudson Test, Justice O’Connor held that the Massachusetts regulations were more 
extensive than necessary to advance the substantial State interest of preventing underage 
smoking.  Philip Morris and the tobacco companies succeeded in their constitutional 
claims against the strongest tool in state governments’ regulatory arsenal against tobacco, 
regulations against advertisements to children.   
  Philip Morris usually had a perfectly timed response to laws and regulations on its 
products or advertising.  It also helped craft laws affecting its business. For instance, 
Philip Morris supported federal laws that benefited the corporation by preempting more 
stringent state laws.  In 1964, the FTC issued its first regulations on labeling, the Trade 
Regulation Rule on Cigarette Labeling and Advertising.
129  The Trade Regulation Rule 
would have required that cigarette packages state the amount of tar and nicotine in the 
smoke of the cigarette which the package contains and that cigarette packages and 
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129 The Trade Regulation Rule on Cigarette Labeling and Advertising was significantly more stringent than 
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cigarette advertising carry a statement such as: "Caution: Cigarette 'Smoking is 
Dangerous to Health. It May Cause Death from Cancer and Other Diseases."  Philip 
Morris lobbied Congress to create a more moderate rule.
130  Philip Morris’ lobbying 
resulted in a more moderate law, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 
(FCLAA) that required the tobacco companies to only issue warnings that “smoking may 
be hazardous to your health.”
131  The FCLAA also preempted agency action.   
After years of the FTC’s and State Attorney Generals’ battles against Big 
Tobacco’s advertising, the FDA entered the ring.  Philip Morris ironically cheered for the 
FDA, another tactic Philip Morris used to continue generating profits.   In the days 
leading up to the bill giving the FDA authority to regulate tobacco in 2009, Philip Morris 
pushed for the legislation because it preempted state laws, many of which were more 
stringent than the FDA law. Until 2009, FDA’s claimed it had no authority to regulate 
cigarettes unless they bore claims that they could prevent or relieve disease.
 132  Only if 
the petitioners have presented evidence that manufacturers of cigarettes “intended that 
they affect the structure or any function of the body of man” could FDA regulate them.
133  
Evidence to this effect was not demonstrated.
134   
Since the FDA could regulate cigarettes if it demonstrated that manufacturers 
“intended to affect the structure or function of the body of man,” FDA published a notice 
of proposed rulemaking in which it claimed jurisdiction over cigarettes as a “device” for 
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Brenner Drew, “The Quiet Victory of the Cigarette Lobby: How It Found the Best Filter Yet—Congress,” 
The Atlantic Monthly (September, 1965), available at 
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delivering the “drug” nicotine.
135  The rulemaking would make cigarettes difficult for 
young people to obtain and included outright bans on some forms of cigarette 
promotions.
136   
The cigarette manufacturers brought suit, arguing that the FDA’s proposed curbs 
on promotion violated the First Amendment.  In Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration,
137 the United States District Court for the Middle District of North 
Carolina ruled that the FDA had shown that manufacturers “intended” for cigarettes to 
affect the body by delivering nicotine.  Judge Osteen of the District Court held that the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act provides that intent may be shown by circumstances 
surrounding the sale of the article and need not rely only on evidence of manufacturer’s 
express representations of intended use.   
The Fourth Circuit of Appeals overturned this verdict in Brown and Williamson 
Tobacco Corporation v. Food and Drug Administration.
138  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion, holding that the FDA’s claim to 
regulatory jurisdiction over tobacco products violates the clear intent of Congress.  Her 
reasoning was that had Congress intended for the FDA to regulate tobacco, it would not 
have considered and rejected bills granting such jurisdiction even after the dangers of 
tobacco use had become well known.  Moreover, if the FDA were given authority to 
regulate cigarettes as drugs or devices, it would ban cigarettes because they are 
“dangerous.”  Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that nicotine is a drug properly subject to 
the jurisdiction of the FDA because nicotine affects the structure and function of the body, 
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and the FDA is not required to prove express claims by the manufacturer in order to 
prove intent.  The relevant intent can be shown not only by a manufacturer’s 
“expressions,” but also by the “circumstances surrounding the article’s distribution.”
139   
Not only were the regulators subject to lobbying capture by the cigarette 
manufacturers, such as Philip Morris, but the tobacco industry was also likely to file 
lawsuits against the regulations questioning the constitutionality and legality of its rules.  
Philip Morris favored federal preemption of state regulations because they were more 
lenient and applied across all states.  Philip Morris could also craft a more targeted 
lobbying strategy if the federal government would preempt the patchwork of state 
legislation.    
 
c.  Kraft’s Strategies in Response to Litigation, Regulation, and Legislation 
  Where Philip Morris often failed in evading the litigation and public relations 
nightmares, Kraft has attempted to succeed.  Its attempts have focused on marketing itself 
as “part of the solution” to obesity.  Michele Simon, a professor of law at UC Hastings 
and public health lawyer, writes in Appetite for Profit: “When it comes to spinning itself 
as a responsible corporate citizen where kids are concerned, Kraft Foods wins the prize 
hands down.”
140   Philip Morris, struggling from years of lawsuits and scarlet letters on 
its reputation, saw Kraft as an opportunity to apply improve its corporate image.       
  In 1998, Philip Morris acquired Kraft foods in an acquisition valued at $13.1 
billion, the second-largest corporate merger in US history.  Between 1998 and 2000,    
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Kraft helped Philip Morris increase its advertising to improve its corporate image by 
1712%.
141  With the merger, the combined company became worth $37.6 billion, the 
largest consumer goods company in the world.  Philip Morris did not stop there, but went 
on a shopping spree at the grocery store by acquiring Nabisco in 2000, another strategic 
move to burnish its reputation and draw on similar marketing talents and distributional 
channels as Big Food.   
  Kraft has made conscious efforts to avoid the protracted legal fights that Philip 
Morris endured.  A major reason that Philip Morris acquired Kraft in the first place was 
to be seen as more socially responsible and distance itself from the negative image 
associated with tobacco.
142  It is therefore, no coincidence, then that Kraft’s “voluntary” 
initiatives have happened to coincide with imminent litigation, legislation, or regulation 
to curtail the obesity crisis.
143  For example, Kraft’s promise to scale back ads to children 
came on the same day that the federal government released its updated 2005 Dietary 
Guidelines for Americans.
144  It also came only two weeks before the company’s 
presentation for the Institute of Medicine (IOM) committee on food marketing to children.  
But Kraft did not define how it would scale back the ads, to what extent it would scale 
back the ads, and at what cost.
145  This pledge has still not been executed to fruition.   
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VII.  Proposals for the FDA Nutritional Guidelines in Countering the Obesity Epidemic 
Although the food industry has in many cases captured the legislative process 
through lobbying or “self-regulation,” some hope rests with regulatory agencies, such as 
the FDA.  The FDA has limited to no authority in regulating the contents of fattening 
foods that contribute to the obesity epidemic, but it has power in its labeling guidelines.  
The current food nutrition guidelines from the FDA are woefully inadequate in 
combating the obesity crisis.  For instance, the nutrition labels on foods are not prominent 
on the packaging.  They are on the side of the box, in small font.  It would be better for 
them to be on the front of the box in large font.  Visuals are often helpful as well.  Listing 
the fat content with its percentage of daily recommended allowance may not be enough to 
deter eaters.  It would be more useful to indicate whether the content of each ingredient is 
“high,” “medium,” or “low.”  A color alert system would also benefit consumers.   
  Another critical problem with FDA’s food labeling guidelines is that in the 
nutrition facts, it does not require a listing of the amounts of each ingredient or the 
percentages of ingredients in the product.  For instance, in a bag of presumably healthier 
brand French Onion Sun Chips, a consumer can only see a list of ingredients in small font 
underneath the nutrition facts:  whole corn, sunflower oil, whole wheat, sour cream, 
mozzarella cheese, sugar.  But what percentage of each ingredient does the bag contain? 
Does sour cream constitute 20 percent of the ingredients?  The FDA should require that 
food companies create a pie chart displaying the percentage of each major ingredient with 
their respective quantities.  A mere listing of grams of fat, or grams of carbohydrate does 
not convey to a consumer exactly what he or she is eating because the consumer cannot 
see, feel, touch, taste a gram of fat or a gram of cholesterol, or a gram of protein.  But a   56 
consumer can feel, see, touch, taste a gram of sour cream or a spoonful of sugar, and they 
know how each makes them feel afterwards.  Cooking advocates often argue: “Eating at 
home is much healthier because you know exactly what you’re putting in your food.”  If 
the FDA required food companies and possibly restaurants to label the quantities of each 
ingredient, purchasing these snack foods or going to restaurants would be significantly 
healthier as people would be fully aware of what they are eating.  
Conclusion:  
  The fight against big tobacco offers several lessons for countering big food in 
helping solve the obesity crisis among our nation’s youth.  The question in the obesity 
crisis is whether we should consider this to be a fight or a collaborative activity.  Should 
the strategy for regulators be one of collaboration or warfare?  The solution lies in a 
mixed strategy, depending on how the food industry acts.  This paper has shown that the 
food industry has begun to appear to play nice. But appearances are often deceiving.  The 
key for regulators will be to distinguish between appearances and reality, and act 
accordingly.  But this crisis should not be seen as a regulator vs. industry battle.  The war 
against tobacco often featured an endless game of cat and mouse, where regulators kept 
pointing the finger at industry and industry denied the accusations.  Meanwhile, the 
public suffered.    
Time and again, as with the tobacco industry, the food industry has demonstrated 
that it has the funds, the power, and the wherewithal to capture the legislative process.  
Therefore, it is critical to work with industry in addressing this obesity crisis and industry 
should be able to find the right incentives to promote healthy solutions.  Healthy   57 
solutions can feed the profit motive.  At the same time, however, there will be times 
when the profit motive will be so strong as to conflict with the healthy choice.  In such 
instances, the regulators, whether through legislation, regulation, or litigation, must 
encourage industry to provide healthy solutions or issue injunctions to prevent them from 
providing the unhealthy options.   
  The case against Big Tobacco was a long, protracted one, where only after several 
decades of costly, litigious, and regulatory warfare, did the federal government decide 
that nicotine is additive and contributes to lung cancer.  It was costly for industry, 
taxpayers, and our children.  The United States cannot afford to do this with the obesity 
crisis.  The crisis is too severe and is rapidly reaching epidemic proportions.  We cannot 
afford to wait and draw out this struggle.  Although proving that some substances like 
high fructose corn syrup cause addiction and obesity is difficult, government must 
educate children in the interim on healthy choices and curtail the advertisements of these 
products on television and in schools.  In addition, the federal government should tax 
sodas and “junk” foods at a rate that has a significant impact on decreasing consumption 
of these products while not overly burdening the poor.  The taxes on tobacco proved 
effective up to a certain amount and then seemed excessive.  Moreover, we must prevent 
the insidious collaboration of big food with big tobacco in the form of mergers and 
acquisitions.  Now that the major tobacco companies have lost significant market share in 
the United States due to more stringent regulations, the tobacco companies have adopted 
a two-pronged corporate strategy: 1. Sell cigarettes in countries where there are lax 
regulations; and 2. Acquire major food companies that currently have less regulatory 
scrutiny and leverage their advertising prowess to selling unhealthy “junk” foods.  Philip   58 
Morris’ recent acquisition of Kraft is a case in point.  RJ Reynolds’ acquisition of 
Nabisco in the 1980’s was another example.  The two major tobacco companies acquired 
the two most significant junk food companies.   
The nation cannot afford for the same tobacco companies that played war games 
with our children’s respiratory health to continue to do so with foods that contribute to 
childhood and adult obesity.  It is critical for the government and litigators to understand 
the strategic motivations of the tobacco companies historically so that they can better 
understand their new motivations as they acquire the food companies.  We as a nation 
must be on our guard, but at the same time, not so hostile to these companies that we 
limit ourselves from providing industry with the proper incentives to make our nation 
healthy.         
 
 
 